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PASSIVE CONSENSUS AND ACTIVE COMMITMENT IN THE SCIENCES 
 
ALBAN BOUVIER 
 
 
Abstract 
 Gilbert (2000) examined the issue of collective intentionality in science. Her paper consisted 
of a conceptual analysis of the negative role of collective belief, consensus, and joint com-
mitment in science, with a brief discussion of a case study investigated by Thagard (1998a, 
1998b). I argue that Gilbert‟s concepts have to be refined to be empirically more relevant. 
Specifically, I distinguish between different kinds of joint commitments. I base my analysis 
on a close examination of Thagard‟s example, the discovery of Helicobacter pylori, and two 
other historical cases involving the Copenhagen school of quantum mechanics and the Aus-
trian school of economics. I also argue that it is difficult to fulfill the condition of common 
knowledge, even in Gilbert‟s weak sense. I conclude by raising serious doubts about the very 
possibility of a certain type of joint commitment which I refer to as an implicit joint commit-
ment. 
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My aim in this paper is to evaluate both the theoretical soundness and the empirical re-
levance of Gilbert‟s concepts of joint commitment and collective belief for understanding 
science. Gilbert argues that scientists might be collectively or jointly committed to scientific 
theories or scientific propositions different from their deeply held personal views. She also 
argues that such commitments can impede scientific progress. In the wake of arguments by 
Coady (1992), Goldman (1999), Hardwig (1985), Hardin (2002), etc., it is generally acknowl-
edged that epistemic trust and epistemic deference to intellectual authorities may be inescapa-
ble in science. But, this does not mean that there is an obligation to accept the opinion of 
somebody merely because he expresses himself as the spokesman of a group. It only means 
that it seems reasonable to trust someone who is an expert in a field if one is a layperson. Gil-
bert thus rightly draws attention to this obligatory aspect of scientific collective life.
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But in this paper I argue that with some further clarification Gilbert‟s concepts can be 
made more empirically relevant and accurate than they are. My approach to epistemology and 
philosophy of science is similar to Thagard‟s (1998a, 1998b). That is, I believe we need a na-
turalized epistemology. Consequently, I aim to compare my proposals with historical data. 
I argue that we need to distinguish more clearly than Gilbert does between explicit joint 
commitment and mere consensus, consensus and implicit joint commitment, and, finally, be-
tween two kinds of implicit or tacit joint commitments. 
 
 
I. Explicit joint commitment and consensus 
 
 
In this first part, I would like to make a clearer distinction between consensus and joint 
commitment than Gilbert does. 
3 
1. Gilbert notes that in certain occasions one can ascribe to a group certain beliefs that 
are not shared by everyone in the group. Although Gilbert does not take real contracts as pa-
radigmatic examples, I believe that the simplest and clearest cases of such collective entities 
and collective beliefs are met in contractualist situations, where, as a member of the group, 
everyone who participates in a vote has to accept the collective decision as his own decision, 
even if this collective decision strongly conflicts with his own deeply held views. In fact, as 
far as the collective decision is procedurally valid, every member is jointly committed with 
every other member to this collective decision. This assumes that the group commitment is 
more than an addition of individual commitments, where each one can decide by oneself 
whether or not to follow the decisions of the group. If somebody disagrees with the decision, 
she has to wait for another assembly or, if the procedures allow such an initiative, to act in the 
way appropriate to convene a new assembly. One can say that the subject of the collective be-
lief is the group or that the collective belief is the belief of the group since it is not necessarily 
the belief of each member in the group. In Gilbert‟s terminology, it means that a “summative 
account” of the decision would not fit in with the effective procedure in such a case. Gilbert 
calls the group in such a case a “plural subject.” 
2. According to Gilbert, many collective beliefs should be understood as the result of 
joint commitments. One can disagree with the relevance of the phrase “collective belief” re-
garding the result of contracts, and several authors in fact have contested this terminology 
(see Meijers 1999 and Wray 2001). It might be more appropriate to speak of collective accep-
tance, given the usual meaning of the words and the famous conceptual analysis given by Co-
hen in Belief and Acceptance (1992). Even Gilbert often speaks of acceptance instead of be-
lief, but without giving specific attention to these lexical variations (2002). According to Co-
hen, belief is a passive mental state – that is, something that happens to you rather than some-
thing resulting from your conscious activity. Belief is, for example, the deeply held conviction 
that members of a jury might have regarding the guilt of a defendant at the very beginning of 
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a trial, without really being able to justify this conviction. Acceptance is an active mental 
state, something that members of a jury can reach only after a personal deliberation at the very 
end of the trial. That is, after having weighed the arguments pro and con for the defendant‟s 
guilt throughout the trial. Even if certain members of the jury might still feel deep down that 
the defendant is guilty, they may accept the conclusion of their personal rational deliberation 
that she is not guilty.  
What is conceivable at the individual level is also conceivable at the collective level. 
And, in the case when collective decision-making is ruled by a formal procedure and in which 
a majority is required, as is the case in European countries where the Napoleonic Code is in 
force, the members of a jury will be jointly committed to the collective acceptance, whether 
the individuals believe deep down in the verdict reached or not and whether they rationally 
accept it or not. For example, even if somebody has personally accepted that the defendant is 
not guilty, she must accept the collective acceptance that the defendant is guilty as her deci-
sion as a member of the jury if the majority (under the Napoleonic Code) says he is guilty. 
Following Gilbert‟s account but using Cohen‟s concept of acceptance, we should say that it is 
a matter of collective or joint acceptance, based on a joint commitment. 
3. In a paper devoted to joint commitment in science, Gilbert (2000) used this concept 
to account for the fact that a medical hypothesis was accepted only very slowly by the scien-
tific community. In the particular case Gilbert discusses, the two scientists who first advanced 
the hypothesis, Warren and Marshall, were eventually awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine. 
It was the hypothesis that gastric and duodenal ulcers are very often the effect of an infection 
by the bacterium Helicobacter pylori. Gilbert argues that this might be because biologists 
were jointly committed to the thesis that even normal levels of gastric acid would prevent any 
bacteria from surviving in the stomach, which was exactly opposed to Warren and Marshall‟s 
hypothesis, and to an alternative explanation – that a gastric ulcer was caused by excess gas-
tric acid. 
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Gilbert‟s account implies that though not necessarily every scientist believed or perso-
nally accepted these claims, every scientist felt committed to collectively accepting them. Al-
though Gilbert recognizes that the word “consensus” has different meanings, in this paper she 
chose to use the expressions “consensus” and “joint commitment” interchangeably. Gilbert 
suspects that the fact that one of the first papers written by Marshall on this topic was rejected 
when it was submitted to the 1982 Australian Gastroenterologist Society Congress might ex-
press such a joint commitment. Thagard (1998a, 1998b) has previously given a very detailed 
account of the discovery and acceptance of this new medical hypothesis in two papers. Scru-
tinizing Thagard‟s report leads me to disagree with Gilbert‟s account of this case. The signi-
ficance of the examination of this case goes beyond this case itself because it is a very com-
mon type of case and it induces us to refine the concept of joint commitment itself. 
4. Thagard does not focus on the earlier rejection of the paper by the committee of the 
Australian association, but when he comes to this issue, the most plausible scenario that 
emerges from his account is the following one. Many and maybe all the members of the 
committee had learned during their university education that the stomach was too acidic for 
any bacteria to survive. Most of them had just learned this from their professors or textbooks 
without being able to personally verify it, so it was a passive belief, something they believed 
in without more examination, merely trusting their professors. But specialists in gastroenter-
ology had been able to verify that the claim was true, so they personally and rationally ac-
cepted the statement that they had already learned at university. It was not a matter of joint 
commitment for anybody – they did not have to accept a statement adopted by an explicit 
procedure in an assembly, and there is no other sign or indication that they were implicitly 
committed to accept this statement. On the other hand, all scientists now acknowledge that the 
first empirical data provided by Marshall claiming the existence of a new bacterium were 
weak. In particular, Marshall could not dismiss the counter-hypothesis that his own microbio-
logical data had been contaminated by bacteria coming from an external source. Thus, there is 
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no reason to think that those who rejected Marshall‟s first paper about the role of Helicobac-
ter pylori in the development of gastric ulcer did it because they felt jointly committed with 
the rest of the medical community to some other hypothesis. A more plausible account is that 
most scientists shared common views on this issue, without having thoroughly examined 
these views. Thus, most scientists passively “believed” what they had learned at university, 
which is an example of what I call a consensus or, to avoid any ambiguity, a passive consen-
sus. But a minority of scientists (gastroenterologists) personally rejected (for good reasons) 
Marshall‟s statement, so their behavior can be accounted for as collective acceptance unders-
tood as a sum of individual acceptances. 
5. What can be misleading is that Thagard himself speaks of “consensus” also; more 
precisely, he discusses medical consensus conferences. In such conferences, the members of 
the panel deliberate on the issue at stake and finally make a collective decision to which eve-
ryone is committed. It is clear that, following the conceptual distinctions I have stated above, 
the “consensus” here is very close to a contractualist situation and is based on an explicit joint 
commitment.  
The crucial point is that the consensus conference discussed in Thagard‟s paper did not 
happen before the discovery that Helicobacter pylori is the cause of ulcers. On the contrary, a 
consensus conference was organized in 1994, that is, after the discovery of the role of Helico-
bacter pylori in gastric ulcers and after its acceptance by the majority of specialists and in or-
der to recommend the use of antibiotics to all physicians.  
Therefore, in this case, Gilbert‟s concept of joint commitment proves to be relevant. 
But, it does not apply to the very slow acceptance of the important medical discovery by the 
scientific community. Rather, it applies to the medical consensus conference long after the 
discovery was made. 
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II. Typical tacit joint commitment 
 
In this second part, I want to focus on a slightly different notion, the notion of tacit or 
implicit joint commitment. I will show that the concept of joint commitment, more specifical-
ly the concept of tacit joint commitment, can provide us with a new account of a famous his-
torical issue: what does one mean when one speaks of the Copenhagen interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics? I argue that Gilbert‟s account of groups is especially illuminating in situa-
tions in which there are not explicit contracts.  
As I have elaborated at length on this case in previous articles (2004, 2007b), I will be 
relatively brief here. 
1. For a long time, speaking of the Copenhagen interpretation was very common, and it 
still is not rare. Some scholars, like Beller (1999) and Howard (2004), recently argued that the 
idea of a unified conception (the Copenhagen interpretation) is mainly due to a retrospective 
view from philosophers of science, especially Kuhn and Popper. They added that, neverthe-
less, the very idea of such a unified conception comes from Heisenberg, who seems to have 
coined the term “Copenhagen interpretation” in 1955 in a volume of essays in Bohr‟s honor 
and extends back to the 1927 Solvay Congress. 
2. Most recent scholars now deny that there was any shared unified conception of quan-
tum mechanics in Copenhagen in the twenties and thirties during the group‟s most creative 
period, which means a conception shared by Bohr, Heisenberg, Dirac, Pauli, etc. Beller 
(1999) and Howard (2004), for example, have established that Bohr and Heisenberg already 
strongly disagreed in the twenties, both before and after the Volta Congress in Como and the 
Solvay Congress in Brussels, which were both held at the end of 1927. What I contend is that 
the idea of a unified group sharing a coherent conception is not a misrepresentation con-
structed by certain philosophers of science like Kuhn, but that the members of the Copenha-
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gen group, as early as 1927, provided themselves with such a representation, although more 
or less involuntarily. I also argue that this is a clear case of joint commitment.  
3. To better grasp this point, it is useful to refer to Gilbert‟s subtle examples of everyday 
contexts in which a person in a group takes the floor as if she were the spokesperson of the 
whole group so that this opinion is ascribed by a larger audience to the group itself, even if 
the other members of the group did not express agreement, just because the absence of expli-
cit disagreement is interpreted as tacit agreement both by the spokesperson and the audience 
(Gilbert 1994). 
4. Something similar seems to have occurred at the Como Conference in September 
1927 and at the Solvay Congress one month later. Thus the idea that the physicists who regu-
larly met in Copenhagen shared a collective conception of quantum mechanics seems to have 
emerged in these particular places. I will focus on the Como conference, more specifically on 
Bohr‟s lecture because this case is the most typical. In this paper, Bohr gave the first expres-
sion of the complementary principle. In all the numerous versions of this paper, even the last 
one (which, however, benefited from many exchanges with Pauli), his formulations are consi-
dered by scholars as quite obscure (Mehra and Rechenberg 1982, Chevalley 1991). Beller‟s 
interpretation is that the obscurity does not come only from the subtlety of Bohr‟s still emerg-
ing ideas about intrinsically complex physical phenomena, but from the fact that Bohr took 
the floor as a spokesman of the Copenhagen group as if each member shared the same con-
ception he was setting out or should have shared it after it had been set forth by Bohr publicly. 
Actually, Bohr seems to have even tried to suggest a conception of quantum mechanics 
so unified that even the “enemy,” Schrödinger, might have accepted this viewpoint. In this 
Como paper, Bohr tried to set forth the role of Heisenberg, Dirac, Jordan, Pauli, Born, and 
even Schrödinger in the construction of quantum mechanics, so that the listeners‟ and then the 
readers‟ impression should at least have been that there was a intensive collaboration between 
all these physicists to reach a common interpretation, which Bohr was formulating in his pa-
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per. Schrödinger did not participate in the Como conference, so he could not agree explicitly 
or implicitly or disagree explicitly. But Heisenberg and Pauli were present at the Como confe-
rence, and neither of them expressed any public disagreement, not even Heisenberg, whom 
Bohr several times referred to regarding the significance of the uncertainty paper to their col-
lective enterprise.
2
 
Consequently, Bohr and the large majority of the people present at the Como confe-
rence might have sincerely thought that it was a conception shared by all the members of the 
Copenhagen group, if not by Schrödinger, and that all of them had worked together in Copen-
hagen “as a body” (as Gilbert sometimes likes to say) to express a joint commitment relation-
ship. However, the letters exchanged by the members of the Copenhagen group show that 
they strongly disagreed with ideas expressed in Bohr‟s paper, and their own personal articles 
confirm that none of them could have accepted all the views or claims stated by Bohr in Co-
mo, even if none of them explicitly disagreed with Bohr‟s ideas in their articles. Beller con-
tends that even Bohr could not really personally accept all the ideas that he assumed as a self-
proclaimed spokesman of the group or of the entire community of physicists (1999, 119). Ac-
cording to this reading, Bohr was not entirely sincere in his lecture. 
Thus, assuming that Beller is right, my conclusion is that the Copenhagen interpretation 
is a collective acceptance of the Copenhagen group, a set of principles to which they were im-
plicitly jointly committed, although this interpretation was not personally shared by any single 
member of the group. This case is a particularly clear case of a view ascribed to a group as a 
group or plural subject, even if the content of what was then ascribed to this plural subject 
was confused and misrepresented the personal views of the members of the group.  
I would like to focus in the third part of this paper on another distinctive aspect of the 
Como conference, the fact that the implicit joint commitment seems to have happened at a de-
termined and very precise time, the day of Bohr‟s lecture, as if it were an explicit commitment 
with a formal procedure. 
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III. Progressive tacit joint commitment 
 
One can take a further step in considering cases in which the implicit joint commitment 
is not performed at a determined and precise time but instead occurs progressively and slow-
ly. This step still moves us a little more away from typical contracts. Not only are these com-
mitments implicit, but one cannot even say precisely at what time they occurred. Nor can one 
really say when these commitments cease, since they may progressively disappear as well.
3
 
Consequently, there can be numerous misunderstandings on the existence of these commit-
ments and on their content. There might not be common knowledge even in the everyday 
sense of the expression, which is far less demanding than the technical one developed by 
Lewis (1969). Conceptually speaking, this kind of implicit joint commitment, of relatively 
undetermined duration, is still more interesting than the previous one because it looks more 
like a passive process, so that empirically speaking, it may be difficult, when people agree on 
an issue, to determine whether one is dealing with an implicit joint commitment or with just a 
passive consensus. 
1. Again, it is convenient to start by referring to Gilbert‟s phenomenological characteri-
zations of joint commitments. Gilbert does not always focus on the same features. Rather, her 
focus changes depending on the specific issues she wants to tackle. Thus, in On Social Facts 
(1989), Gilbert focuses on situations in which a joint commitment is progressively, although 
slowly, emerging between two people. These situations, very common in everyday life, also 
happen in scientific life, where they might be very common as well. The main problem is to 
know if the condition of common knowledge (even in the weak sense) is ever satisfied. 
2. I will consider two examples, the first one borrowed from the later Copenhagen 
group, the other one from the later Austrian school in economics. I add this latter example be-
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cause this case is even clearer than the former on this issue. The two groups are very similar 
in numerous aspects, so the comparison may be particularly significant. In both cases, the ear-
lier group was a group renowned for its great intellectual freedom. Thus, Bohr, Heisenberg, 
Dirac, Jordan, and Pauli are now almost unanimously regarded as having had very different 
ideas on many issues, for example, on the relevance of the complementary principle or on its 
meaning, on realism and pragmatism, on causality, on the exact relevance of the matrix 
theory, etc. (Beller 1999). As for the economists Carl Menger, von Wieser, and Böhm-
Bawerk, although they shared some basic assumptions about the relevance of the marginalist 
revolution in economics, of the principle of methodological individualism, and so on, they 
disagreed on many other topics, e.g. on the theory of money (Boettke 1994a, 1994b). 
In both cases also, the later periods are reputed to have been much less creative than the 
earlier periods and the social structure of the groups to have also exerted a negative effect on 
younger researchers. But it does not seem that it was due to only or even mainly external per-
sonal pressure. On the contrary, in both cases the situation looks more as if the leading figures 
thought that the younger scientists were as committed to the same collective scientific goal or 
view as they were themselves. Actually, in both cases, one encounters clear evidence of stu-
dents or younger scientists having experienced guilt due to the fact of merely having thought 
differently from their master or the leader of the group, which reveals that they had felt that 
there was a sort of obligation to assent to certain specific ideas. Furthermore, it seems that 
they acknowledged that this obligation was legitimate. And in at least one case, in the later 
Austrian school, one also meets the reciprocal situation, a case of strong indignation. But the 
most important aspect of these two cases here is that there was not a specific context in which 
one can say a sort of implicit joint commitment had been contracted in this situation, as in the 
case of the Como conference. In both cases, the commitment seems to have happened much 
more progressively. 
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3. In Bohr‟s case, Beller says that certain scientists felt guilty for not thinking like Bohr. 
“Bohr‟s unpublished correspondence discloses the overwhelming guilt experienced by those 
physicists who dared to challenge him.” (1999, 274) She refers more specifically to 
Weizsäcker‟s case. Weizsäcker was already respected as an excellent physicist and was no 
longer Bohr‟s student. Besides, he belonged to the younger generation, and he could not have 
attended the Como or the Brussels conferences. Consequently, he could not have felt jointly 
committed with the other members of the Copenhagen group to Bohr‟s or Heisenberg‟s 
statements during these particular events. He was just a regular participant in the later Copen-
hagen seminars. But Beller reports Weizsäcker once remarked, after having met Bohr and un-
derstood hardly anything, “What must I understand to be able to tell what he meant and why 
was he right? I tortured myself on endless solitary walks” (275). Weizsäcker‟s reaction seems 
strange since it might have seemed more rational to trust oneself and be skeptical of the relev-
ance of Bohr‟s statements, even if epistemic deference is necessary. It is true that it might just 
have been epistemic deference, but the idea that he should think that Bohr‟s thoughts were 
true at least raises the question whether he did not feel committed to assenting to Bohr‟s 
ideas. Beller suggests that this kind of behavior is typically the kind of attitude that may pre-
vent researchers from being innovative. In any case, there was not an explicit joint commit-
ment and if the implicit commitment hypothesis is right, this implicit joint commitment does 
not seem to have been generated in a specific situation.
4
 
4. A still clearer case, both with respect to guilt and indignation and in several other re-
spects as well, is the later Austrian school. Von Mises‟s followers created the von Mises Insti-
tutes, which had the goal of advising politicians on economic issues, basing this advice on 
scientific assumptions. These institutes constituted cases of explicit joint commitments since 
they contained explicit statutes, in which it was even written what one ought to believe (or to 
accept) to be “an Austrian” in economics (Cowen 1991). The membership was submitted to a 
formal, and therefore explicit, procedure as well. But before the creation of these institutes, 
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von Mises himself was the center of a group in which it seems that not only were there impli-
cit joint commitments, but the implicit joint commitments were also progressive and slow. 
5. The most characteristic testimony of guilt and indignation is found, on the one hand, 
in the memoirs of von Mises‟s wife (von Mises 1976) and, on the other hand, in the strange 
Homage to von Mises that Fritz Machlup, a former assistant to von Mises, wrote (Machlup 
1981). Von Mises‟s wife reports that Machlup had once expressed an opinion different from 
Mises on an epistemological issue. Specifically, Machlup thought that the recent “positivist” 
philosophy of science, like Carnap‟s, made von Mises‟s conception of the a priori signific-
ance of the rationality principle hard to uphold. And von Mises expressed such strong indig-
nation that he refused to talk to Machlup for several years. Machlup himself reported another 
case, with less lasting effects on their relationship, in which von Mises expressed indignation 
because Machlup had expressed an opinion contrary to his on the gold standard issue. But in 
his Homage Machlup expressed explicit feeling of guilt at having thought and publicly ex-
pressed something different from his master. He tried to demonstrate that his position was ac-
tually derived from von Mises‟s principles, going so far as to say that it was von Mises‟s posi-
tion on the gold standard that was not coherent. Therefore, it was von Mises instead of Mach-
lup, who had broken the joint commitment (Bouvier 2007a)! 
6. But the main point here is that there had never been in the Austrian school a situation 
similar to Bohr‟s Como lecture. I have not found any report that von Mises had once publicly 
spoken on the behalf of the Austrian group as its spokesman at such a crucial event. On the 
other hand, most of the time, Machlup, who was von Mises‟s former student and was later 
even von Mises‟s assistant, is not considered as having shared the most typical ideas of the 
Austrian group. And the von Mises Institutes had not yet been set up. Thus there were not de-
termined occasions in which Machlup might have jointly committed – explicitly or implicitly 
– with von Mises or other members of the Austrian group. It is instead the fact that Machlup 
had worked closely with von Mises for a certain time that had finally pushed Mises to think 
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that a joint commitment had implicitly emerged between them. Thus, this case enables us to 
see clearly that the implicit commitment probably just occurred without a clear act of the will 
at a specific time from either of the two participants. Consequently, the confusion with a pas-
sive process is easy. 
7. To conclude this third part of my investigation, I would like to focus attention on a 
point that contradicts what seems to be an essential condition of joint commitment situations 
if one follows Gilbert‟s accounts of joint commitment. Often Gilbert states that common 
knowledge is a necessary condition. But for her it does not mean that each individual who is 
jointly committed knows that each other one is committed as well and knows that everyone 
knows that he knows, and so on (Gilbert 1989). Actually, it has been long argued by many so-
cial scientists that such a demanding condition is psychologically quite implausible and, fur-
ther, that communication nevertheless often succeeds (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1986). But 
even if what is required is only that each participant in a situation just knows that the others 
are committed too as he is, it seems to be rather obvious that the possible implicit character of 
a joint commitment, and, furthermore, the fact that in a given situation one cannot even de-
termine when it starts and when it ceases, leave the real existence of a joint commitment very 
uncertain. Consequently, empirically speaking, one must expect numerous misrepresentations 
on the issue of knowing whether in such and such situations there is a joint commitment or 
not (and on the matters on which there may be a joint commitment as well). Indeed, in Bohr‟s 
case, both Bohr and the younger physicists seemed to have thought they were jointly commit-
ted even if the commitment was implicit and had progressively occurred. But in von Mises‟s 
case, whereas evidently Mises thought that Machlup was committed to the same statements as 
he, it is questionable whether Machlup thought he was breaking a “joint commitment” when 
he expressed a position different from von Mises‟s. It instead seems that Machlup realized on-
ly afterwards that von Mises thought Machlup was jointly committed to the same statements 
as he; and then Machlup understood at this moment he was wrong not to have understood that 
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he was actually implicitly committed. Consequently, he felt guilty, at least for a while. In the 
gold standard case, Machlup seems to have considered that, in fact, his position was much 
more coherent with von Mises‟ core principles, that both might have been jointly committed 
to these principles, although, again, he had not personally understood that he was committed 
and that, in any case, it was von Mises who had broken the joint commitment. 
Finally, I would like to conclude this investigation by focusing again on the fact that 
empirically speaking, it is not always easy to know whether one is dealing with joint com-
mitment or consensus. In Warren and Marshall‟s case, anyway, one can notice that even if 
Warren was senior and Marshall junior, there is no evidence at all that they were jointly 
committed with each other in a sense that might have prevented Marshall from breaking this 
commitment. However, it is a fact that their first common publication was not a joint paper. 
They chose a very unusual style, which Lancet accepted by publishing in the same issue one 
letter from Warren reporting Warren‟s own first discoveries signed by Warren only, and 
another letter from Marshall reporting Warren and Marshall‟s joint discoveries, signed by 
Marshall only. It is as if for some reason, they were reluctant (or at least one of them was re-
luctant) to contract a joint commitment in signing a joint paper (Thagard 1998b, 330 n. 3). 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have proposed some new conceptual distinctions, particularly between 
mere consensus and explicit joint commitment, and between two kinds of implicit joint com-
mitment, one still looking like an explicit contract although possibly more misleading, and 
another one whose content and even existence may be still much more undetermined. Finally, 
based on historical data, I have emphasized the fact that common knowledge, even unders-
tood in Gilbert‟s broad sense, is a condition very difficult to fulfill. Consequently, one should 
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be skeptical about the very existence of groups in Gilbert‟s sense, that is, as “plural subjects”, 
at least in science. 
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lecture in the department of philosophy, University of California, Irvine, May 7, 2009. 
2
 Dirac could not come to Como (Mehra and Rechenberg 1982).  
3
 Philip Pettit (2003) has elaborated in detail on the issue of temporal group identity. But 
he only envisages groups that have been constructed through real contracts (therefore explicit 
joint commitments; see above). His model has not yet been applied to scientific groups or its 
empirical relevance evaluated, although it could be. 
4
 There was an intermediate period at Copenhagen. According to Beller, as early as 
1930, “young physicists … were exposed automatically to the new philosophy .... most of 
them simply adopted the official interpretation without deep deliberation” (1999, 39). She 
adds, “Heisenberg was aware of this. In his 1930 book, which he dedicated to the „diffusion 
of the Copenhagen spirit,‟ Heisenberg conceded that „a physicist more often has a kind of 
faith in the correctness of the new principles than a clear understanding of them‟ ” (39). 
Heisenberg and Beller here are giving a very typical example of collective passive belief or of 
what I call a (passive) consensus. 
